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NION agreements designed as a pact for peaceful production haveU become a potentially powerful weapon for prosecuting the war.
Ever since this country undertook to make itself an arsenal of
democracy our national problem has been to obtain a smooth, constant,
and increasing momentum of industry-more planes, more tanks, more
ships, more munitions, faster and ever faster. The stupendous congres-
sional appropriations for this program have merely displayed our earnest-
ness; the administrative schedules and engineers' blueprints have defined
our expectations; but in order to achieve our goal it has been necessary to
transform nation-wide industries and to integrate the labor of millions of
human beings along the production lines. To management and labor this
has meant displacement and reorganization, the training of new workers,
the speeding of old processes, the increase of productive hours, the work-
ing of shifts, and the elimination of wastes, accidents, and stoppages. None
of these things could be performed automatically or immediately, regard-
less of the need. They required understanding, planning, and experimenta-
tion by people in agreement.
Most American employers and employees were completely unprepared
for such large scale adjustments. They were unaccustomed to military de-
mands, uncertain of their own interest, and unwilling to be stampeded by
war fears. When they did act, they followed their usual patterns of be-
havior. In the setting of employment relationships, the usual pattern for
a great many employers and employees was the process of collective bar-
gaining. Through that process they enlisted in the gigantic scheme of
war production upon which the Allied Nations depend for victory. Their
experiences have suggested even greater potentialities in the use of the col-
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lective bargaining process and have prompted this analysis of union agree-
ments as a war measure.
There are several theoretical aspects of union agreements that are. sig-
nificant to the war program. The most significant is that union agreements
facilitate production. Yet other advantages are found in the determina-
tion of industrial relations by the persons most deeply concerned, in the
reliance upon voluntary private action instead of state regulation, in the
utilization of a democratic, representative procedure and in the reinforce-
ment of such action through the powers of law. These basic principles of
union agreements are principles which offer power and drive to our war
production.
The importance of such factors is well highlighted by the legal dilemma
of enforcement under war supply contracts. In normal times the govern-
ment purchase contract permits the Government to withhold fqnds until
performance is complete, and, in the event of a failure to perform, the Gov-
ernment may purchase the goods elsewhere and charge the contractor with
any increase in price. Ordinarily, a performance bond is required and the
surety may be required to pay the damages sustained. But in time of war
the Government must have the goods and cannot be satisfied with dam-
ages. The war can be won only with guns, planes, and ships and not with
money withheld or with money judgments. The materials of war cannot
be purchased freely on the open market. Every source of supply is needed
and every contract must be performed promptly or there is an irreparable
loss. Performance is the only thing that counts, and it is in the assurance
of willing and eager performance that the collective bargaining agreement
is crucial.
Union agreements are primarily a means for determining working rela-
tionships in industry. They recognize the general tasks to be performed,
they set the incentives for labor, they protect the health and vitality of
the workers, they allocate responsibility, they maintain discipline, and
they prescribe rules and orderly procedures for adjusting disputes or mis-
understandings. A union agreement is a code for harmonious industrial
activity. As such it is a propitious starting point for war production.
Moreover, a collective bargaining agreement is a voluntary arrange-
ment for industrial government. The terms of the agreement represent
the freely expressed wills of the employer and his employees, subject only
to those restraints which flow from the unavoidable pressures of living to-
gether. From the divergent interests of employer and employees and from
their uneven economic strength arise the friction and the flame in which
are welded a common design. The union agreement, good or bad, is the
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handiwork of the parties themselves. Their joint participation breeds a
feeling of personal responsibility. Such an agreement offers a basis for a
sense of creativeness and the maintenance of high morale so essential to
the battle of production.
Collective bargaining is a social institution peculiarly suited to this war.
Both are expressions of democracy. In the eyes of most American workers
the war is a struggle of democratic nations against the aggression of totali-
tarian states abroad, and collective bargaining is the preservation of the
democratic spirit in industry at home. The bargaining of employers and
employees through representatives of their own choice is democracy at
work. It is a practice that inspires faith in our avowed war aims and
elicits every possible effort in war production.
The voluntary and democratic characteristics of union agreements still
allow for compulsion against those who refuse to abide by the majority
will. The courts may declare the agreements binding and enforce their
provisions without sacrifice of the freedom exercised in their creation. Al-
though historically much doubt was cast upon the enforceability of union
agreements, the trend of legislation and court decisions has been unmis-
takably toward the recognition of the complete legality of such agree-
ments.' If the parties so intend, there remain no insurmountable obstacles
to the formulation of a union agreement that will be a fully enforceable
contract. The difficulties of suit inherent in the union's status as a volun-
tary unincorporated association have been mitigated by statutory enact-
ment and equitable doctrine, and they may be further overcome by the
expedients of joining union officers as parties and expressly providing that
all union members be third parties beneficiary. Careful draftsmanship in
the light of the peculiar holdings of state courts can produce an agreement
that will be enforceable with all the sanctions of the state.2
These theoretical advantages of collective bargaining agreements have
been demonstrated in the practices of many employers and employees in
our war industries. Although the apparent structure of their union agree-
I The relevant court decisions and a selected list of legal periodical articles on union agree-
ments are presented in Ziskind, Shienbrood, and Malamed, The Law behind Union Agree-
ments 27-87 (1941); see also Lenhoff, The Present Status of Collective Contracts in the
American Legal System, 39 Mich. L. Rev. ziog (1941).
2 Specimen clauses of union agreements together with special notes dealing with the prob-
lem these clauses present in meeting the tests of various courts are collected in Lieberman,
The Collective Labor Agreement (1939). The Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States
Department of Labor soon will make available a more elaborate compilation. In the following
footnotes some of the clauses selected from contracts in effect in war plants and others drafted
by the writer are set forth. These specimen clauses will be found helpful as supplements to
suggestions made in the text.
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ments has remained unchanged, the specific provisions of their agreements
have been deliberately designed to obtain the maximum production of the
implements of war. The captions of wages, hours, overtime, safety, griev-
ances, strikes, and arbitration have been left undisturbed and much of the
language of the old agreements has been repeated. Yet there have ap-
peared many subtle changes and some new references to military service.
War industry employers and unions have consciously sought to assist in
the mobilization and placement of the labor force, in the optimum use of
skills and capacities, in the fullest exploitation of equipment, in the pre-
vention of strikes and lockouts, in the suppression of sabotage and sub-
versive activities, and in the equitable distribution of material incentives.
The devices they have employed and the possibilities for their more effec-
tive use may be observed within the familiar terms of employment.
WAGES-THE INCENTIVE FOR WAR PRODUCTION
The war has created new difficulties in the determination of wages.
The danger of inflation, the "pirating" of workers, the need for maximum
production, and the hazards of certain industrial activities have produced
new wage considerations both within the realm of collective bargaining
and within the field of national economic policy.
The dangers of inflation have led to measures for the curtailment of
wage increases. In the President's seven point program against inflation,
he called upon the National War Labor Board to stabilize wages. The
board responded by limiting all wage increases in the cases brought before
it in accordance with three criteria: i) a cost-of-living adjustment limited
to a 15 per cent increase from January 1, 1941 to May, 1942; 2) the re-
moval of inequities among comparable employments; and 3) the elimina-
tion of substandard wages. 3 In his Labor Day message to Congress the
President made clear that further limitations will soon be placed upon all
wage rates. Such a program will confine severely the scope of collective
bargaining; yet it will not eliminate the need for collective bargaining on
other terms of employment or on incidental wage problems such as com-
pensation for overtime, vacations with pay, and the adjustment of piece
rates or new occupation rates within the limits set. Also, if in the composi-
tion of the future regulatory agencies, organized employers and employees
are given representation, some elements of collective bargaining may be
preserved even within the limits imposed by the anti-inflation policy.
The willingness of organized labor to accept restrictions imposed by the
3 See In the Matter of Bethlehem Steel Corp. ("Little Steel" decision), WLB Release No.
B-122 (July x6, 1942).
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necessities of the war when the essence of collective bargaining is preserved
has been demonstrated in the shipbuilding and other industries. Early
union agreements negotiated in the shipbuilding industry with the ap-
proval of the Government provided for a wage increase with an increase in
the cost-of-living index. When the time came for such an adjustment, the
President appealed to the unions to forego their contract rights in the in-
terest of avoiding inflation. After some negotiation the workers accepted
less than they were entitled to by their contract. 4 Likewise, to avoid in-
flation, the construction unions agreed with the chief contracting agencies
of the Government to freeze their wage rates as of July i, 1942.s In a
similar spirit, the AFL and the CIO, although originally opposed to the
WLB cost-of-living formula, have accepted it. Anti-inflationary measures
which restrict the scope of collective bargaining may be enforced with the
least disruption of morale if they are put into effect through conferences
or agencies in which both employers and employees participate.
Without minimizing the importance of avoiding inflation, it should be
recognized that unless our production pace is accelerated and kept at high
speed we may suffer consequences even more dire than those of inflation.
It will help us little to freeze wages if at the same time we chill our pro-
ductive ardor. Production is our primary problem and in stimulating pro-
duction our most effective incentive is wage payment, and our most effec-
tive way of applying that incentive is through collective bargaining. Pa-
triotism can be relied upon to inspire most American workers with a will-
ingness to do all they can to win the war. But patriotism is an emotional
force of fluctuating intensity. If profits seem unduly large, if the tax pro-
gram seems inequitable, if food and clothing prices rise while wages are
kept down, or if political or racial ambitions are not satisfied, the tide of
patriotism may ebb low. The expectation of wages is so ingrained in our
mental makeup that it is doubtful that a patriotic fervor can be sustained
for long without it. If we are to get the most effort out of war workers, we
must rely not only upon patriotic zeal but also upon the wage incentive.
It would seem desirable to adopt special wage devices, designed to pay
workers in proportion to their output and thereby to stimulate more and
more production. These "incentive plans," unfortunately, are still so
clouded by the abuses of certain employers and so obscured by the fears of
workers that it is perhaps too optimistic to expect the full utilization of
such schemes at an early date. The obstacles of suspicion and fear, how-
4 The New Shipbuilding Agreement, io L.R.R. 423, 674 (1942).
s Wage Rise Limits in the Building Industry, zo L.R.R. 442 (1942).
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ever, can be minimized through the voluntary and cooperative approach
of collective bargaining. In a few instances, union agreements for war pro-
duction have recognized the possibility of introducing special wage stimu-
lants.6 In the industries that have had special inducement plans, such as
piece rate and bonus systems, union agreements have continued those
plans.7
The device of cash bonuses or emergency wages for work made danger-
ous by the war has been adopted in the maritime industry. Union agree-
ments covering shipping have defined dangerous zones and offered the
men on ships special bonuses 8 and war risk insurance 9 to keep up the flow
of supplies through enemy infested waters. As the war has spread its areas
of hostile operations, these agreements have been revised to cover the
spreading risks. Should the raids of bombers spread great dangers to cer-
tain areas of our country, workers will respond with patriotic defiance, but
6 See Wage Provisions in Union Agreements, 53 Monthly Lab. Rev. 1126 (1941); Wage
Incentive Plans and Collective Bargaining, Memorandum No. 2 of the Industrial Relations
Div. of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Labor (April, 1942).
7 For sample piece rate provisions see Browne, Trends in Union Agreements, 3 Conference
Bd. Management Rec. 43 (1941).
8 "War Bonus i. The emergency compensation to cover war risk hazards to the unlicensed
personnel of the Company's vessels shall be as follows:
(a) On the trans-Pacific Far East and Australian runs, $8o per month from the iSoth
meridian, westbound, until return to the z8oth meridian, eastbound. [Other provisions are
made for other portions of the world.]
Emergency Wages 3. In the event a vessel is interned, destroyed or abandoned as a result
of war operations and is unable to continue her voyage, basic wages and emergency wages
specified in the collective bargaining agreement between the Company and the Union, dated
October 3x, 1941, shall be paid to the date the members of the crew arrive in a Continental
United States port and the employees shall be repatriated to a Continental United States port.
4. The Company agrees that it will pay each unlicensed member of the crews of its vessels
the value of all personal effects lost or damaged due to hostilities or war-like operations up
to a total sum of one hundred and fifty dollars ($15o) per man." Supplementary Agreement
between N.M.U.A. and various ship-owners, 6 Pilot ii (i94x).
9 "2. The Company will furnish as promptly as possible through the medium of private in-
surers war risk insurance in the amount of $5,000 for each unlicensed member of the crews of its
vessels on all voyages in the areas described above. Such policy shall provide for the payment
of the said sum of $5,ooo to the estate or designated beneficiary of such unlicensed member of
the crew in case of death due to war conditions or the payment of said sum in periodic install-
ments to the unlicensed member of the crew himself in the event of his total and permanent
disability due to such war conditions, and shall provide for payment to the unlicensed member
of the crew of such sum less than $5,ooo in case of injury less than total or permanent disability
resulting from such war conditions as are provided in the form of policy generally adopted by
American underwriters to cover such war risks and known as Crews' War Risk Insurance
Form-i941 ..... It is understood that in the event war risk insurance is made available
by the United States Government, the Company and the Union will enter into discussions inso-
far as it relates to this section." Ibid.
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it may also be desirable to use similar provisions for extra compensation
in strategic industries.
A more immediate wage problem has been that of maintaining a degree
of uniformity in wage rates in order to avoid the enticement or "pirating"
of workers from one war plant by another. This has been the concern of
several Government agencies. The War Manpower Commission has at-
tempted to deal with it through its employment offices, but until the use
of government employment offices is made mandatory other voluntary
adjustments will also be needed. The United States Conciliation Service
and WLB have attempted to induce employers and employees to coun-
teract "pirating" through wage, seniority, and other provisions in union
agreements. Industry-wide stabilization programs through collective bar-
gaining have also been sponsored by the War Production Board. Under
the auspices of the Shipbuilding Stabilization Committee of WPB, em-
ployers and unions in the shipbuilding industry formulated wage and other
labor standards, which have served as the basis for collective bargaining
agreements establishing wage uniformity within each of the Atlantic,
Pacific, Gulf, and Great Lakes areas.'0 When it became apparent that
there might be a precipitous flow of labor from aircraft plants to shipyards
on the West Coast, collective bargaining adjustments were suggested and
made in the aircraft industry. Later WPB sought to stabilize wages
throughout the aircraft industry, and, though the first conference was un-
successful, others may follow. Under Government direction, collective
bargaining may help eliminate excessive labor turnover by stabilizing
wages.
The wage clause of union agreements has always been the nerve center
of industrial relations. It has linked all productive elements in a well co-
ordinated unit or it has thrown them into utter confusion. Upon it the
war has placed certain unusual demands. National policies of inflation and
production have supervened the private interests of certain employers and
employees. But the recognition of those policies as well as the private
interests has been obtained through the process of collective bargaining
with Government aid and direction.
OPTIMUM HOURS FOR WAR PRODUCTION
The optimum number of hours of labor for war production is still a
matter of conjecture."' We know that beyond a certain number of hours
x0 See items concerning Shipbuilding Stabilization Committee Contracts in 8 L.R.R. 467,
585, 732 (194*)
"x Brown and Baker, Optimum Hours of Work in War Production (1942); Kassoris, Hours
and Efficiency in British Industry, 52 Monthly Lab. Rev. 1337 (i94i); Hours of Work in
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per day or per week human fatigue causes a declining productivity per
man, and further work without rest causes so much illness and so many
accidents that in the long run the total output decreases. But the exact
number of hours best for production is at present unknown. It obviously
varies with different industrial conditions and until scientific studies are
made, we must adopt tentative standards like eight hours a day and forty-
eight hours a week or proceed in a trial and error fashion to find the best
work schedule for maximum production, plant by plant. In this situation,
collective bargaining offers an opportunity for pooling experiences and for
canceling out prejudices. When the findings of scientific studies on hours,
fatigue, accidents, and production are known, they may find recognition
and voluntary adoption through union agreements. Possibly some provi-
sion might be made in current agreements for such studies. 2
The need for the fullest exploitation of plant and equipment has given
rise to overtime and shift work. This has been facilitated by many war
industry agreements not only by direct provisions for such work's but also
by provisions designed to prevent the abuse of such work. Employers are
frequently required to give advance notice of changes in the regular work
schedule 4 and extra work is required to be compensated at premium
rates.'5 Employees are prohibited from laying off during regular hours and
Relation to Health and Efficiency, Report of the Division of Women in Industry and Minimum
Wage, N.Y. Dept. of Labor (1941).
X2 Such a clause might read as follows: The employer and the union agree to cooperate with
[the U.S. Department of Labor, the War Production Board, or whatever Government agency
may offer] to study the optimum hours of work for maximum production in the plants covered
by this agreement, and upon the receipt of the findings and recommendation of said Government
agency the schedule of hours provided for in section -hereof shall be adjusted accordingly.
This section shall apply only to work upon war contracts and for the duration of the war.
'3 See Levine, Shift Operations in Selected Defense Industries, 53 Monthly Lab. Rev. 355
(1941); Patterson, Shift Operations under Union Agreements, 5i Monthly Lab. Rev. 86o
(1940).
14 "In the event conditions in the shop shall, in the opinion of the Company, necessitate
longer hours than hereinabove specified, the management shall notify the Shop Committee
and/or the employees one day in advance." Brewster Aero. Co.-United Automobile Workers
Contract, 8 L.R.R. 154 (i941); "Art. X-§I. In the assignment of men or shifts of men who
are required to work on Saturdays and Sundays, notices shall be posted three days previous to
such assignments (except in emergency), designating the men and the type of work to be per-
formed." American Cyanamid Co.-Chemical Workers Union Contract, 9 L.R.R. 490 (1942).
Z3 Overtime Provisions in Union Agreements in Certain Defense Industries, 52 Monthly
Lab. Rev. 841 (1941); see also American Cyanamid Co.-Chemical Workers Union Contract,
9 L.R.R. 490 (3942).
To equalize overtime rates, the President issued Executive Order 9240, September 9, 1942,
and Executive Order 9248, September 17, 1942, establishing overtime, Sunday, and holiday
rates for all work relating to the prosecution of the war. Union agreements may make specific
applications of these orders and may aid in obtaining compliance.
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working overtime just to earn extra pay. Elaborate schedules for the
rotation of shifts have been devised in order to make possible continuous
production for twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week without
any overtime work.'6 Such schemes require a swing shift of men who work
irregular hours, and extra compensation has often been found necessary
to induce men to work the swing shift and the night shifts. Continuous
production also calls for extra workers or the working of successive shifts
to fill the gaps when replacements fail to appear at the scheduled times.
To maintain continuous production throughout the year it may also be
necessary to induce certain indispensable workers to accept extra pay
and forego part or all of their vacations.' 7 Adjustments for all such con-
tingencies have been made through union agreements so that war plants
might be used to their utmost.
The provisions for extra compensation for overtime, night shifts, and
week-end work have been assailed as restrictive penalties upon war work.
In response to such criticism some unions, especially in the construction
industry, early in the war program consented to reduce their overtime and
Sunday rates from double time to time and a half. 8 More recently, at the
request of the President and the chairman of WPB, CIO and AFL re-
solved to urge their constituent unions to relinquish double compensation
for Sundays and holidays worked in a regular six-day work-week. 9 Time
and a half compensation for extra work, however, has become traditional,
and, except for the attacks of certain persistent opponents, it has been
accepted as an incentive for added effort in war production.20 The Gov-
ernment has made allowances for such extra cost in its contracts, and
there is little evidence, if any, that the extra overtime pay has restricted
X6 Wage and Hour Div., U.S. Dept. of Labor Releases Nos. R-1675 (December 14, 194I)
and R-17I 9 (January ig, 1942).
'7 "It was agreed that the Corporation, in lieu of vacation with pay for the year 1941,
would pay on or before December 24, 194o, to each regular hourly rate employee who has at
least one year's seniority on December 1, 1940, the sum of $4o." Chrysler Corp.-United
Automobile Workers Agreement, 7 L.R.R. 491 (i94o); see also Pay in Lieu of Vacations in
Certain Federal Services, 53 Monthly Lab. Rev. 415 (1941).
i8 Government-AFL Building Pact, 8 L.R.R. 764 (1941).
19 CIO Waives Double Time to Aid U.S. War Effort, 5 CIO News, p. i, col. 4 (March 30,
1942); testimony of William Green reported in Hearings before the House Committee on
Naval Affairs on H.R. 6790, 7 7 th Cong. 2d Sess., at 2803 (1941); Saturday and Sunday Pro-
visions of Union Agreements in 12 War Industries, Memorandum No. i of the Industrial
Relations Div., of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Labor (February, 1942).
20 Hearings before the House Committee on Naval Affairs on H.R. 6790, 7 7th Cong. 2d
Sess., at 2429-2922 (194y).
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the actual hours worked.2' The popular debate upon the cost of overtime
has detracted attention from the more important fact that union agree-
ments can be utilized to make adequate provision for shift work and
continuous production.
TRAINNG AND LABOR SUPPLY
The conversion of industry from the goods of peace to the instruments
of war has given labor and management many new tasks, and the tre-
mendous expansion of our total output has called for a vast increase of
skilled and semiskilled workmen. 22 Also, as our armed forces draw men
from the mills and factories, women need to be trained to take their
places.2 3 These gigantic reorganizations require the cooperation of work-
ers-cooperation which may be obtained more quickly and more willingly
when the program is endorsed by a union agreement.
The In-Plant Training Program of WPB stresses the training of workers
through gradual steps of advancement on the job.24 Traditional occupa-
tional classifications and shop routines are rearranged so that the unskilled
may be taught to take over semiskilled tasks and the semiskilled taught
special skills. The skilled workers are relieved of their simpler tasks so
that their talents may be utilized to the utmost. Such changes may be ex-
pedited by a union agreement clause that provides for such upgrading or
for cooperation with the officials of WPB in the conduct of an in-plant
training program.2 5
"1 Testimony of Donald M. Nelson, ibid., at 2576-2624; Testimony of Frances Perkins,
ibid., at 2626-67.
22 The Labor Market in the Emergency, 8 Employment Security Rev. r (i941).
23 Sidney Hillman, Labor Director of WPB, has said, "More than one million American
women will be needed to work on the production of war materials." WPB Release No. 5I
(January 27, 1942).
'4 The Labor Division of OPM has inaugurated a bulletin service entitled The Training
within Industry Program, see particularly Training within Industry, Bull. No. i (August 15,
1941); Upgrading in a Rapidly Expanding Plant, Bull. No. 3 (August i5, 194); Training
•Production Workers, Bull. No. 2a (August 15, 1941).
2 "2. Management will study its future tool, die and metal pattern shop needs, and will
post on the bulletin board a list of jobs for which a shortage of journeymen is anticipated.
Employees now working on production machines, who have experience and qualifications for
such jobs, will be permitted to file applications with the Personnel Department, listing their
experience and qualifications for jobs as operators of one or more machines in the tool, die, and
metal patterns shops in order that they may be considered when vacancies occur.
"3. When vacancies occur in the tool, die and metal pattern shops, and journeymen are not
available for employment, such vacancies are to be filled by the upgrading of the workers in
the plant who have necessary qualifications to perform the work and who have previously
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One of the obstacles to the acceptance of a thorough program of re-
training workers is the fear of certain organized workers that through the
dilution of their skills the bargaining position of their unions may be un-
dermined. A union that has organized a majority of the skilled workers in
a plant and has established its right to bargain for them as a separate unit
often looks with suspicion upon any effort to split the tasks of its members
and to add many more semiskilled workers who may overwhelm it by
sheer number and transfer its bargaining rights to another group. In order
to allay such anxieties, it is possible to write into a union agreement a
clause which preserves the established rights of the union.26
The shortage of certain skilled workers has revived an interest in ap-
prentice training.27 During the depression of the thirties there was no
need for new craftsmen and a fear of surplus labor led to a widespread
abandonment of apprenticeship systems. The prospect of a long war,
however, has disclosed the value of thoroughly skilled workers who may
be adapted to all sorts of work and for this an apprenticeship program is
indispensable. To overcome our inertia as well as the old fears of an in-
discriminate multiplication of craftsmen, the Federal Committee on Ap-
prentice Training (now part of the War Manpower Commission) has en-
gaged in a promotional campaign for the voluntary adoption of an ap-
made application for such work." United Automobile Workers-General Motors Corp.
Agreement, 5 United Automobile Worker 3 (October 1, i941).
"It is mutually agreed that the parties hereto will cooperate with Governmental agencies
offering training courses in the type of work performed in the shops of the Company." Boeing-
Internat'l Ass'n of Machinists Agreement, 7 L.R.R. 107 (1940).
26 "Nothing contained herein shall be construed to alter or diminish in any manner whatso-
ever the identity of the craft of- as a unit for the purposes of collective bargaining or the
exclusive representation of that craft by the -. The parties hereto agree that the dilution
of the craft provided for herein is solely to facilitate emergency defense work, that all workers
employed to perform the tasks relinquished by the craft - shall be regarded as temporary
employees regardless of how long the war program may last, and that for all purposes of col-
lective bargaining such employees shall be represented solely by the
"The management agrees that in employing workers to undertake the tasks relinquished
by the -, it shall advise all such employees of the terms of this agreement, that all such
employment shall be conditioned upon the acceptance of this agreement and that upon the
termination of the war program it shall do everything within its power to restore to the
the jurisdiction and collective bargaining recognition and rights enjoyed by the organization
prior to the date hereof." These clauses were drafted by the writer for the use of a group of
drop forge employers and the Internat'l Die Sinkers Conference during negotiations conducted
by the U.S. Conciliation Service. In a later arbitration their adoption was required by the
arbitrator, Lloyd K. Garrison, xo L.R.R. 66 (1942).
27 Defense Program Acts as Spur to Apprenticeship, 3 Labor Standards 138 (1940); Out of
Crisis, Opportunityl, Div. of Labor Standards, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bull. No. 4 3 (194o).
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prenticeship program with adequate standards of training and adequate
safeguards of established labor standards.21 It has induced employer and
employee organizations to unite in joint councils for the administration
of this program, and individual employers and union locals have adopted
its standards in union agreement clauses.29
Union agreements in placing the responsibility for the training of work-
ers and apprentices upon both the employer and the union assure the
training program of the support and cooperation that is essential to its
success.
The training of new workers, however, should be secondary to the utili-
zation of all of the existing skilled and semiskilled workers. Unfortunate-
ly, various personal and social factors have produced an immobility of la-
bor and an unwillingness on behalf of employers to hire certain groups of
workers, seriously impeding the effective use of many of our workers.
Much can be done to overcome these obstacles by providing for coopera-
tion with the Government agencies at work in the field of labor supply and
training. An agreement requiring registration and assignment through
the United States Employment Service would tend to stabilize the war
labor market,30 and such provisions need not sacrifice the closed shop or
any union participation in the hiring process. 3' Also, an agreement re-
28 This committee, while a part of the Division of Labor Standards, U.S. Dept. of Labor,
made available the plans of several apprenticeship programs. The standards of the programs
are concrete examples of methods for training apprentices in a private plant. They are issued in
the expectation that committees or individuals concerned will find them useful as a basis for
discussion. Some of -the programs available are Lockheed Aircraft Apprenticeship Program
(i939), Toledo Plan for Sheet Metal Working Apprenticeship (1939), Trimmer Die Making
and Die Sinking Apprenticeship Standards (1939), Houston, Tex., Machinist's Apprenticeship
Standards (1940), and Apprenticeship Standards for Vultee Aircraft Inc. (i941).
29 "There shall be established a regular apprenticeship system in accordance with the stand-
ards of the Federal Committee on Apprenticeship, within thirty days from -. Such
apprentice system shall include the use of the written indenture; a total learning time of
years; a starting rate of - per hour, increasing every six months at a proper percentage to
reach the minimum - rate in - years, increases to take place on April - and
October - of each year, providing the apprentice has been employed 5oo hours or more
in the six months' period; a ratio of one apprentice to every journeyman (exclusive of, and
not counting for this purpose, any temporary employees, as defined in paragraph ), who
may be assigned to work as -. " Recommended by the Apprenticeship Section, Div. of
Labor Standards, U.S. Dept. of Labor.
30 The dangers of private employment services to the war program, as well as the ordinary
abuses of private employment agencies in peacetime, are well discussed in the Hearings before
the House sub-committee of the Committee on Labor on H.R. 5510, 7 7th Cong. ist Sess., at
19, 21 (1941).
31 The U.S. Employment Service has effected arrangements with employers and unions to
obtain and supply union labor in accordance with union shop agreements in the metal trades,
the building trades, and the ladies' garment industry in New York City and elsewhere.
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quiring the employment of personnel without discrimination on the basis
of age, sex, race, creed, color or national origin, 3 patterned after the poli-
cies announced by the President and the several agencies combating dis-
crimination,-3 would tend to enlarge the available labor force. Much also
can be done to remove some of the barriers to the introduction of women to
war jobs by union agreement clauses providing for equal pay for equal
work34 and for the retirement of temporary war employees after the ter-
mination of hostilities. Perhaps the most serious retarding influence to the
transfer of skilled machine shop workers from nondefense to war plants is
the fear of losing the economic security acquired through seniority
schemes, and this too might be mitigated by providing for the retention
and accumulation of seniority rights regardless of a shift to war work-
even when employment is taken with another employer3s The mobiliza-
32 There shall be no discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment on the basis of race, creed, color or national origin.
33 A joint bulletin of the Committee on Fair Employment Practice, the Negro Employment
and Training Branch of the Labor Division of OPM, and the Minority Groups Branch of the
Labor Division of OPM summarizes the official steps taken to eliminate discrimination in de-
fense employment up to October, 1941. See Minority Groups in Defense (October i5, 194i).
341n General Motors Corp. v. Read, 294 Mich. 558, 293 N.W. 751 (i94o) the Supreme
Court of Michigan upheld the constitutionality of a statute which provided that "Any em-
ployer .... employing both males and females in the manufacture or production of any
article, who shall discriminate in any way in the payment of wages as between sexes or who
shall pay any female engaged in the manufacture or production of any article of like value,
workmanship and production a less wage, by time or piece work, than is paid to males simi-
larly employed .... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." Mich. Stat. Ann. (Henderson, 1938)
§28.824.
3sOn Sept. 17, 1941, the Labor Division of OPM enunciated a set of labor curtailment
policies for the automobile industry. In October, i94x, an industry-wide interpretation of these
policies was adopted by General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, Packard, Hudson, the Automotive
Parts Ass'n, and the Tool and Die Manufacturers Ass'n, as well as by the United Automobile
Workers. This agreement provided for industry-wide seniority, in part, as follows: "Where a
man working on non-defense production is laid off and obtains defense employment with
another company, and that fact is certified to his former employer, he will not have to report
back for non-defense production work in order to protect his seniority so long as he retains the
defense employment to which he was certified .....
"Skilled tradesmen, partially employed, or employed at occupations other than their trade
or its equivalent in defense usefulness, will be released upon their request, with protection of
their seniority rights, for full time defense work (4o hours per week) at their trade ..... The
prospective employer must certify to the present employer that he has offered the employee
full-time defense work (40 hours per week) at his trade, before the request is granted.
"(a) Recall of Employees. Any employees loaned or laid off, whether unemployed or cur-
rently employed on defense or non-defense work, must report back for defense employment to
the company with which he holds his original seniority for work in the same community, if and
when called, on notice of at least one calendar week. Recall of employees to defense work
presupposes the management will endeavor to provide full-time employment, contingent
upon the availability of the essential tools, materials and facilities. Skilled tradesmen will be
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tion of industrial workers for war work can be expedited appreciably by
union-management policies that recognize the need for a larger, more
skilled, and more adaptable working force and that offer the necessary ad-
justments for such a force.
SAFETY AND HEALTH
The prevention of industrial accidents is a subject on which there is
unanimous approval, but unfortunately very inadequate action. The
men and man-days lost because of industrial accidents since the com-
mencement of our defense program have been increasing at an alarming
rate..6 Unless the trend is reversed we may suffer the most serious defeats
of the war at home. Trade union agreements frequently call for safe and
wholesome conditions of work and the observance of all laws on the sub-
ject.37 Occasionally there are more specific clauses on such matters as
first-aid stations, clean lunchrooms, lockers and shower baths, safety
meetings and adequate accident reports. One of the most neglected as-
pects of the safety program, however, has been the active participation of
the workers themselves in safety work. Probably because most of the
conditions required for safety and health have called for activity on the
part of management, the possibilities of employee cooperation have been
overlooked. It is all the more important, therefore, that union agreements
be utilized to enlist the positive efforts of employees in a safety and health
program. The agreement may establish a safety committee representa-
tive of both employer and employees; it may require periodic investiga-
tions of plant conditions; it may authorize the formulation of safety rules
or the adoption of a safety code; it may provide for safety education; it
may outline procedures for handling safety grievances; it may penalize
those who fail to obey the safety rules; and it may encourage cooperation
between the shop safety committee and Government agencies engaged in
safety work.3s
subject to recall only for full-time defense employment at their trades or the equivalent."
5 United Automobile Worker 2 (October x5, 1941).
36 The reports of injuries under the State Workmen's Compensation Laws, as summarized
by the Division of Labor Standards, U.S. Dept. of Labor, show an increase of injuries in 194i
over 1940 of 29 per cent. At the same time, the number of non-agricultural employees in-
creased i.i percent. Preliminary estimates of the Industrial Accident Division of the Bureau
of Labor Statistics for the early months of 1942 indicate that the trend has continued.
37Vutee Aircraft, Inc.-United Automobile Workers Agreement, 7 L.R.R. 321 (1940);
Boeing Aircraft Co.-Internat'l Ass'n of Machinists Agreement, 7 L.R.R. 107 (,940).
38 The writer has attempted to incorporate these features in the following clause:
There shall be appointed a Safety and Health Committee composed of an equal numberof
employer and union representatives and a safety official to be designated by the employer who
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LABOR DISPUTES AND THEIR SETTLEMENT
The need for industrial peace to win the war is axiomatic. The immi-
nence of significant work stoppages and the urgency of the numerous pro-
posed controls are much more debatable. Nevertheless union agreements
have reflected the widespread willingness of employers and unions to ban
strikes and lockouts and to establish more orderly procedures for the set-
tlement of their disputes.
The determination of industry and labor representatives at the Presi-
dent's Conference on Labor Relations that there shall be no strikes and no
lockouts for the duration of the war and that all disputes shall be sub-
mitted to arbitration, has set a pattern for collective bargaining agree-
ments. In themselves the commitments of the national leaders of indus-
try and labor stand as a solemn pledge, probably without legal effect be-
cause there was no intent to enforce their agreement as a contract. The
parties to that understanding had no power to order strikes or lockouts
except for their individual unions or business firms; still they proposed to
speak, not for their own organizations, but for all industry and labor.
They undertook to use the prestige and power of their positions to effectu-
ate the terms of their agreement. In all but a few instances, that has suf-
ficed to maintain peace. It may be desirable, nevertheless, to incorporate
the terms of that understanding into the collective bargaining agreements
between particular employers and the unions of their employees so that
those terms might constitute an enforceable contract. 39
shall act as chairman of the committee. This committee shall meet at regular intervals, no
less than once a month, shall make periodic inspections of the plant, shall review accident
reports and analyze the causes of accidents, shall formulate rules for the prevention of acci-
dents and shall promote in every way possible the safety and health of all employees.
After investigation and study, the Safety and Health Committee shall adopt rules with
respect to i) Physical Conditions; 2) Sanitation and Hygiene; and 3) Safety Practices.
The Safety and Health Committee shall establish penalties for the violation of its safety
and health rules and shall impose such penalties upon the employer or the union or the super-
visory official or the employee found responsible for any violation.
Any dispute concerning proposed rules for safety and health or concerning any action
taken by the Safety and Health Committee by virtue of its rules may be regarded as a griev-
ance and adjusted in accordance with the provisions of section - of this agreement.
The Safety and Health Committee shall enlist the aid of State and Federal safety and health
officials such as the factory inspection and industrial hygiene officials of the State of
and the National Committee for the Conservation of Manpower in Defense Industries, and
shall cooperate in every possible manner with such officials.
' Such an agreement might read as follows: There shall be no strikes, lockouts or other
cessations of work for the duration of the war. Should all other means provided herein fail to
effect a settlement of any dispute between the employer and the union, the dispute shall be
referred to the Secretary of Labor for certification to the WLB and the parties hereto shall
abide by the recommendations of that board.
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The union agreements that have been adopted in war industries, most
of which still antedate the President's Conference, have contained a wide
variety of limitations upon the right to strike.40 Most of these have re-
quired the postponemeit of work stoppages pending a resort to grievance
procedure or arbitration schemes.4' A few have qualified the strike pro-
hibition so that the workers might still refuse to cross picket lines or refuse
to handle nonunion goods, or otherwise resist anti-union activities.42 In
other agreements various types of work interruptions-strikes, sitdowns,
slowdowns, stayins, lockouts, and shutdowns-have been completely for-
bidden.43 Forms of picketing, boycotts, and sympathetic action also have
been banned. 44 Ever since the commencement of the defense program,
40 The provisions in 25 agreements are classified in Strike Prohibitions and Clauses Provid-
ing Arbitration in Contracts, 8 L.R.R. 316 (1941). For recommendations of the National
Defense Mediation Board in regard to stoppages see 8 L.R.R. 701 (1941).
41 Strike Restrictions in Union Agreements, 52 Monthly Lab. Rev. 546 (194i); see also
Packard Motor Car Co.-United Automobile Workers and Federation of Architects, Engineers,
Chemists and Technicians Agreement, 8 L.R.R. 9 (1941); Sperry Gyroscdpe Co.-Brother-
hood of Scientific Instrument Makers of America Agreement, 8 L.R.R. 591 (1941); General
Motors Corp.-United Automobile Workers Agreement, 6 L.R.R. 591 (i94o).
42 "During the life of this agreement no strikes shall be caused or sanctioned by the Union
and no lockouts shall be made by the Company. Any action of the employees in refusing to
go through a picket line in case of an officially declared strike by some union directly working
on the job, if said strike is sanctioned and approved by the Seattle Central Labor Council and
Local No. 751 of the Internat'l Ass'n of Machinists, shall not constitute a violation of this clause
of the Agreement." Boeing Aircraft Co.-Internat'l Ass'n of Machinists Agreement, 7 L.R.R.
xo6 (194o).
"There shall be no strike or other curtailment of production, nor shall there be a lockout,
because of any dispute or grievance which is subject to arbitration or because of any labor dis-
pute in which the Company is not involved, provided that the Company shall not require any
employee to work on any ship moved from a shipyard which is on strike." Maryland Drydock
Co.-Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America Agreement, 6 L.R.R.
851 (1940).
"There shall be no strikes, lockouts or stoppages of work during the term of this agreement,
it being the intent of the Employer and the Union that all controversies or disputes shall be
settled amicably and harmoniously. Refusal to pass through picket lines established by reason
of disputes between the Employer and other unions whose members are employed on the vessels
covered by this agreement shall not be construed as a violation of this agreement." Puget
Sound Navigation Co.-Inland Boatmen's Union of the Pacific Agreement, 6 L.R.R. 713
(940).
43 "The Union will not cause or engage in or permit its members to cause or engage in, nor
will any member of the Union take part in, any sit-down, stay-in, slow-down, or sympathy
strike in the plant of the Company, or any curtailment of the work or restriction of production
or interference with production of the Company.,....
"The management will not cause or sanction a lockout." Brewster Aero. Co.-United Auto-
mobile Workers Agreement, 8 L.R.R. 155 (i941).
44 "The Union and the employees agree that they will not call, engage in, participate in or
sanction any .... picketing, stoppage or retarding of work, refusal to handle merchandise,
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there has been a trend in union agreements toward the inclusion of such
provisions, insuring uninterrupted production.
The provisions for the handling of grievances and the arbitration of un-
settled disputes have similarly varied with the custom and individual
preferences of particular employers and unions.45 Most of the differences
have not been vital. Practically all agreements have detailed a procedure
for the adjustment of complaints, showing to whom the complaints shall
be submitted, who shall first attempt a settlement, and to whom an appeal
shall be taken. The important element has been the joint participation of
employer and employee representatives in an informal, speedy, and inex-
pensive process.
For disputes that remain unsettled, there has been an increasing resort
to arbitration. Some employers and unions have hesitated to refer all mat-
ters to arbitration, some limiting arbitration to violations of the agree-
ment, others to interpretations of the agreement, others to the subjects
covered in the agreement. 46 Still other employers and unions have agreed
to maintain uninterrupted production by submitting to arbitration all dis-
putes of any nature, whether arising out of their existing agreement or out
of an effort to renew or revise an agreement. The machinery employed for
arbitration has varied from bi-partisan boards with an impartial chairman
to an individual arbiter. When the neutral person has not been designat-
ed, the agreement has usually indicated the manner of his selection by a
federal, state or other outside agency.47 The arbitration tribunals have
been created for individual cases or established as permanent systems of
arbitration. Occasionally the agreements have specified rules of procedure
for the arbitration but most of the agreements have left this to the discre-
tion of the arbitrators.48
Union agreements banning strikes and referring disputes to the chan-
machinery and equipment or any other interference with the operation and conduct of the
Employer's business for any reason whatsoever .....
"The Union and the employees further agree that they will not call upon the Employer to
participate or assist in the enforcement of any public or silent boycott against any product
used by the Employer." Sperry Gyroscope Co.-Brotherhood of Scientific Instrument Makers
of America Agreement, 8 L.R.R. 591 (i94i).
4s See Arbitration Clauses in Contracts, 8 L.R.R. 365 (1941) where a number of defense
agreements are analyzed; see also Contract Clauses on Arbitration, Seven Provisions Are
Formulated by American Arbitration Ass'n for Incorporation in Agreements where the Ass'n
Is to Be Asked to Provide Services, io L.R.R. 81 (1942).
46 Bureau of National Affairs, Collective Bargaining Contracts 132-36 (1941).
47 Ibid., at 116-32.
48Ibid., at 137-4o.
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nels of grievance procedures, conciliation and arbitration have been en-
couraged by the National Defense Mediation Board49 and more recently
by WLB. Although the President has indicated his readiness to exert his
war powers in overcoming an open defiance of such procedures, 0 it is the
policy of the Administration to seek voluntary resort to such procedures
expressed in union agreements.,
Most of the foregoing discussion has dealt with terms of employment
traditionally part of union agreements. The war, however, has brought
forth novel situations that call for provisions and techniques heretofore
given scant attention. The exigencies of military service, production plan-
ning and government supervision are such situations. In all these mat-
ters, union agreements may be utilized to formulate satisfactory policies
and to enlist cooperative effort.
MITARY SERVICE PROVISIONS
Union agreements have recognized the inevitability of a great exodus
of men from industry to the armed forces and the eventuality of their re-
turn. To mitigate some of the hardships involved in the workers' separa-
tion from employment and to facilitate their return to work, several agree-
ment clauses have been devised .
2
Some agreements have given cash payments or other benefits to em-
ployees who leave for military service. This supplemental pay usually has
been limited to a certain amount and to a certain time. 3 For employees
49 The Pattern of NDMB Settlements, 8 L.R.R. 700 (194r).
so Military occupation of a plant was ordered by the President in three cases under
NDMB and three more under WLB. Report on the Work of NDMB from March 1g, r941 to
December 7, x941, at 7.
51 In its final report NDMB said, "The principal purpose of the creation of the Board is
contained in the last words of the Executive Order of March ig: 'to avoid strikes, stoppages
and lockouts.' This objective was pursued directly and temporarily by relieving the strike
rash or more lastingly by the preventive medicine of furthering sound collective bargaining.
The Board followed both these techniques, mindful always that an agreement willingly
reached is more enduring than one arrived at under undue influence of any sort." Ibid.
5' Military Service Provisions of Union Agreements, Study No. 7 of the Div. of Industrial
Relations of the Graduate School of Business, Stanford University (2d Memo i94o); Seniority
Policies and Procedures as Developed through Collective Bargaining, Industrial Relations
Section, Dept. Economics and Social Institutions, Princeton University (1941); Browne,
op. cit. supra note 7, at 41-44; War Clauses in Collective Bargaining Contracts, 7 L.R.R. 461
(1941).
S3 A unique variation of such a provision exists in the Vultee Aircraft, Inc.-United Auto-
mobile Workers Agreement, 7 L.R.R. 321 (i94o) which provides for supplemental pay in case
the Army or Navy takes over the plant. "If one or more employees are conscripted by the
Army or Navy and assigned to work at their present positions with the Company, and if the
entire plant of the Company is not conscripted and taken over by the Army or Navy, the com-
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disabled so they cannot return to work, severance pay has been provided.
Group insurance has also been continued within the limitations of cover-
age permitted by the policies.54 Many of these provisions were drafted
prior to this country's declaration of war and were designed to care for
selectees in training for short periods of time, but it may be advisable to
adapt such agreements to war conditions.5
Many union agreements have sought to give the employee who goes to
war an assurance of job security when he returns. This has been done
primarily through clauses, preserving his seniority rights and promising
him re-employment s6 The Selective Training and Service Act of i94o 7
establishes similar rights to re-employment, but it is possible to provide
pany will pay to such employee the difference between their present salary and the base rate
of pay plus living expenses that will be paid to them by the Army or Navy."
A proposed clause in a model contract of the American Newspaper Guild follows: "The
publisher agrees that all employees who leave their posts to serve in the armed forces of the
United States or their adjuncts, shall receive full salary during the period of that service less
any salary which may be paid to them for the service. The publisher further agrees that such
employees shall be granted the same posts immediately upon their return with severance pay
rating and other rights under this agreement unimpaired."
S4 "Any employee on the seniority list, who is now covered by group life insurance shall
continue to be protected by this insurance while in the military service and while this country
is now at war, and the Company will pay the premium for those men during this period."
Advance Pressure Casting, Inc.-National Ass'n of Die Casting Workers Agreement, 7 L.R.R.
231 (1940).
ss "It is agreed, however, that the corporation shall discontinue paying the premiums on
the group life insurance of any such employee if and when the United States Government
commences to carry life insurance on the lives of persons engaged in military service and train-
ing, or in the event an increase in premium charges is put into effect by the insurance company,
or in the event the group life insurance policy protection on the lives of persons engaged in mili-
tary service and training is discontinued by the group life insurance company with which the
corporation has contracted for group life insurance." Chrysler Corp.-United Automobile
Workers Agreement, 7 L.R.R. 491 (194I).
s
6 
"Any employee who is called into active service, or who in time of war volunteers in the
armed forces of the United States shall be given a leave of absence for, and will accumulate
seniority during such period of service, and upon the termination of such service will be re-
employed, provided he has not been dishonorably discharged and is physically able to do avail-
able work in line with his seniority, at the current rate for such work, and provided that he
reports for work within 6o days of the date of such discharge." General Motors Corp.-United
Automobile Workers Agreement, 6 L.R.R. 591 (i94o). For other clauses of similar character,
see Packard Motor Car Co.-United Automobile Workers Agreement, 8 L.R.R. 88 (i94i);
Brewster Aero. Co.-United Automobile Workers Agreement, 8 L.R.R. 155 (194r); King
Powder Co.-United Mine Workers of America Agreement, 7 L.R.R. 2o6 (194o); Maryland
Drydock Co.-Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America Agreement
6 L.R.R. 831 (194o); Postal Tel.-American Communications Ass'n Agreement, 7 L.R.R. 84
(194o); Vultee Aircraft, Inc.-United Automobile Workers Agreement, 7 L.R.R. 323 (1940).
5754 Stat. 890 (1940), so U.S.C.A. § 308 (Supp. 1941).
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through union agreements for more extended periods in which to apply for
re-employment and for more liberal protection than exists under the quali-
fied language of that statute.
Union agreements may also protect servicemen and their unions from a
loss of organizational rights and powers because of a depletion of their
ranks by the war. The agreement may provide that persons engaged to
take the places of men called to military service shall be temporary em-
ployees hired only for the duration of the war. This might discourage rival
unions from attempting to use the new employees for jurisdictional strife
and might make it impossible for the new employees to dislodge the re-
maining members of the union from their bargaining position. Likewise,
in order that deferments from military service may be obtained for essen-
tial union officials and may not be used to discriminate against union
members, it has been provided that certification for deferment shall be
made with the mutual consent of management and union representa-
tives58 Although such provisions appear motivated by the self-interest of
small groups or a few individuals, they may serve to eliminate industrial
disputes and to elicit more willing service in the armed forces.
WAR PRODUCTION PLANNING
For many years, workers' participation in management has been a term
to conjure with. Radical unionists and conservative businessmen saw in it
the beginning of a new economic order, a promise which filled the one with
hope and the other with horror. Leaders of most unions, however, dealt
with rules of production in an opportunistic fashion, to gain whatever
advantage they could in standards of work and living for their members.
Employers generally resisted such union demands as encroachments upon
the prerogatives of ownership, yet they made many concessions. Some of
these old attitudes linger on, but the war is casting a new light upon man-
"agement-labor cooperation in the planning of production.
At the outset of the defense program, certain leaders of organized labor
called attention to the large quantities of unused plant capacity and un-
employed man power available for war production. CIO suggested the
creation of industry councils, representative of management, labor, and
the Government, 9 and AFL sought labor advisory committees integrated
s8 Brewster Aero. Co.-United Automobile Workers Agreement, 8 L.R.R. 155 (194i).
s9 See Murray, Survey of the Steel Industry (1941); Reuther, 500 Planes a Day (194);
Report on Increased Production of Vital Non-Ferrous Metals (1942) (a research report by the
Internat'l Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers).
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into Government agencies ° as the media for planning maximum produc-
tion. These committees were not established, but the Labor Division of
OPM, in which organized labor was influential, proposed a plan for farm-
ing out contracts to the idle small shops of the country.6' The practice of
spreading Government work through subcontracts was so helpful that the
program was expanded until it assumed proportions requiring a separate
administrative agency within OPM.2 Labor's early insistence upon this
production technique and its acknowledged soundness led to persistent
proposals of management-labor cooperation in the planning of war pro-
duction.
WPB has sought to capitalize the advantages of joint labor-manage-
ment planning through the establishment of War Production Drive Com-
mittees in all plants engaged upon war work.63 These committees have
been designated by employers and employees, and where the workers have
been organized the work of the committees has become a regular union
activity. The official plan book released by WPB has suggested that the
joint labor-management committees direct their attention to i) taking
care of tools, 2) preventing breakdowns, 3) cutting down accidents, 4)
good lighting, 5) maintenance and repair, 6) adapting old machines to
new uses, 7) cutting wastage, 8) breaking production bottlenecks, and 9)
using every machine to the fullest extent.61 Wherever necessary subcom-
mittees are to be established for these several functions. This program has
not been promoted as a mere publicity campaign. It has been urged as a
permanent production drive for the duration of the war. By August i5,
1942, 1,255 plants had reported active joint labor-management commit-
tees.15
From these committees have come numerous ways and means for im-
proving and accelerating production. Through posters, slogans, charts,
and plant publications, they have spurred workers on to meet and exceed
the goals of the war production program. They have reduced absentee-
6o A.F. of L., Report of the Proceedings of the 6ist Annual Convention, 14r, 204-5, 539-41
(1941); Declaration of A.F. of L. Policy on War, 49 American Federationist 10 (1942).
61 Farming-out Bulletins Nos. x-5, Labor Div., OPM (194o).
61 See Defense Contract Service, Production Div., OPM (1941).
63 This program is described in a letter from Donald M. Nelson to the President, WPB
Release No. 387 (February 27, X942); see also radio address of Mr. Nelson, WPB Release No.
403 (March 2, 1942); letter from Mr. Nelson to all prime contractors, WPB Release No. 455
(March 6, 1942); call for regional conferences, WPB Release No. 537 (March iS, 1942).
64 WPB, Production Drive Official Plan Book (1942).
6s WPB, Weekly Report of Progress of the War Production Drive (August i2, 1942).
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ism; they have saved materials; they have brought forth from the men in
the plant suggestions for new processes and new tools that have drastically
reduced the man-hours required for certain tasks. In recognition of such
services, the Government has devised a system of awards for the outstand-
ing "production soldiers." How effective this joint labor-management
scheme will be in the total planning of war production remains to be seen,
but its possibilities appear to be legion.
In the longshore industry on the Pacific Coast, the president of the
International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union sought to plan
production with the employers and offered to withdraw all of the objec-
tions of his union to labor-saving devices, to permit special crew work and
to waive all working rules inconsistent with maximum production.6
Though at first greeted favorably by the employers' representatives, this
proposal was later rejected. The union persisted, however, in its efforts
and finally induced the Administrator of the War Shipping Administra-
tion to establish a Pacific Coast Maritime Industry Board, consisting of
an impartial chairman, two representatives of the operators, and two repre-
sentatives of the longshore unions on the Pacific Coast. This board was
given power "to coordinate the efforts of the employer and employee
groups on the Pacific Coast for the purpose of increasing efficiency in load-
ing and discharging vessels in that area."67
These approaches to production planning through management-labor
cooperation may be spread more widely and more effectively through un-
ion agreements. Such agreements may provide specifically for adjust-
ments in working relationships indispensable to the success of the pro-
gram. Their possible contributions to the planning of production may be
demonstrated by indicating a few of the problems in need of solution.
In some industries, there have evolved union working rules which have
the effect of limiting or spreading production. These were designed to pro-
tect employment and income in periods of depression and many are lim-
ited to periods of slack business activity. Others not so confined are at
present an obstacle to maximum war production. The union agreements
which contain them should be revised, and many steps in that direction
have been taken.6"
6 The minutes of the Longshoremen Section of the Conference To Determine Policy, U.S.
Maritime Com'n, contains copies of the proposals and counter-proposals made. See 5 Labor
Herald i (December i9, 1941).
67 General Order No. 5, U.S. War Shipping Admin. (March i, 1942).
68 The proposals of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union for labor-
management planning of production suggested that a joint council be empowered to "recom-
mend and aid in putting into effect through the collective bargaining machinery of existing
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Many employers, seeking to preserve some of their normal operations
and to retain some of their old customers as an assurance of post-war busi-
ness, have refused to convert their plants to war production as rapidly as
our military needs require. In this position, they have often been support-
ed by workers fearful of unemployment during the period of retooling and
plant reorganization. The apprehensions of both these groups have been
allayed somewhat by government contracts and labor training programs,
but the participation of both employers and employees in the develop-
ment of plans that provide for the needs of both has reduced much of the
cost and hardship involved in industrial conversion and has hastened the
necessary adjustments. Such plans have been developed, with Govern-
ment aid, for geographic localities like Buffalo, New York,69 and the State
of New Jersey7° and for industries like rubber 7' and silk.72 This technique
of war industry planning has been overlooked in the recent reorganiza-
tions of WPB, but its potentialities for good are still far from exhausted.
Some of the government contracts for war work have encouraged ex-
pensive and uneconomical practices. The abuses of the World War I cost-
plus-a-percentage-of-the-cost contracts have been largely overcome, but
some of the current cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts offer little or no induce-
ment to economical production. A few of these contracts, for the loading
of ships, have given the contractor a supervisory fee based on the amount
of labor employed so that by prolonging the task and increasing the num-
ber of man-hours of work the contractor was able to increase his profit.
union agreements changes in or suspensions of working rules that interfere with maximum
production in loading or unloading war materials and supplies aboard ships." Letter from
H. B. Bridges to Capt. E. Macauley, U.S. Maritime Comn, December 'i, 1941.
The following agreement confers general powers upon the employer: "The Union agrees to
accept the standards of production as established by the Company. The Union also agrees
that members of the Union shall perform their duties in accordance with the established stand-
ards of time and quality.
"The policy regarding speed of operation shall be discussed with the Chief Steward. The
employee shall not be held responsible for time lost while he is in the plant for breakdown or
any slowing up of production that is not the employee's fault.
"This does not prohibit the Company from effecting economies by the installation of im-
proved methods or design." Packard Motor Car Co.-United Automobile Workers and Fed-
eration of Architects, Engineers, Chemists, and Technicians Agreement, 8 L.R.R. 89 (1941).
69 OPM Release No. AD-2 (September 23, I941).
7o OPM Release No. PM-148 (September 13, 1941).
71 OPM Release No. PM-iio3 (September 7, 1941); OPM Release No. PM-i86i (December
18, 1943).
72 OPM Release No. PM-1io, (September 6, 194); OPM Release No. PM-1175 (September
17, 1941); OPM Release No. PM-h182 (September i8, 1941).
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The utilization of employer-union committees to plan production has
served as a check upon such practices.7 -3
In all of these situations it is possible to eliminate the restrictions upon
war production through joint management-labor planning. Although
government assistance may be highly desirable, the cooperation of man-
agement and labor as expressed in collective bargaining agreements as-
sures faster action and continued support for the adjustments required by
the wai program.
GOVERNMENT SUPERVISION
The tremendous powers of a war government and its responsibility for
the successful prosecution of the war are a great temptation to the exercise
of absolute and arbitrary controls. The heads of our war agencies, how-
ever, have recognized the importance of maintaining our democratic tra-
ditions, so that time and again they have chosen to seek voluntary co-
operation rather than resort to compulsion. In the field of labor relations
they have encouraged collective bargaining and sponsored union agree-
ments.
The work of the Shipbuilding Stabilization Committee is an outstand-
ing example of how a Government agency has served the war program
through the device of collective bargaining agreements. 74 That committee
convened the representatives of industry and labor in regional conferences
and assisted them in the formulation of basic terms of employment which
were later incorporated into individual employer-union agreements. Wage
scales, hours of work, grievance procedures, and arbitration machinery
were established uniformly within competitive areas. The industry was
thus spared the turmoil of competitive turnover. At a later date the
President proposed a twenty-four-hour, seven-day production schedule,
and that plan of operation was likewise adopted by union agreement.
Still later it became apparent that the adoption of plans for continuous
production would be facilitated by foregoing double pay for Sundays and
holidays, when such days were merely part of a regular six-day week; and
that change was also made by agreement in many of the shipyards. More
recently, the wage scales were scheduled for an increase in accordance with
a cost-of-living clause in the agreements.75 In order to counteract infla-
tion, the President requested the shipyard workers to relinquish their
73 General Order No. 5, U.S. War Shipping Admin. (March i, 1932); The Minutes of the
Longshoremen Section of the Conference To Determine Policy, U.S. Maritime Com'n 3-11
(December i9, 1941).
74 See the pamphlet of the Labor Division, OPM, entitled Ships for Freedom (1941).
75 WPB Release No. 46 (January 27, 1942).
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rights to that increase, and again, in a collective bargaining conference,
the agreements were revised in the interest of the war program. The rec-
ord of the Shipbuilding Stabilization Committee is an imposing illustra-
tion of how collective bargaining has been utilized to stabilize production
and to adjust it to changing needs in one of the most vital of war indus-
tries.
In the field of public construction also the Government has recognized
the force of collective bargaining. For many years the Government had
been determining wages and hours on public works and might have con-
tinued to do so without further consultation with organized labor. In-
stead, the contracting agencies, acting through OPM, negotiated an
agreement directly with AFL building trades unions76 The Government
gave the unions the assurance of union wages on construction jobs in rural
centers where the local supply of labor was inadequate, and the unions
agreed not to strike and to accept time and a half pay for overtime where
they had formerly obtained double pay. Later when the Government
sought to check wage increases, another agreement freezing wages as of
July i, 1942, was made with the construction unions.77 A Wage Adjust-
ment Board, representative of all parties, was established to settle dis-
puted claims and it has disposed of all grievances amicably. Thus in one
of the least coordinated and most competitive war industries, union agree-
ments have served as a stabilizing force.
The technique of the Government in stimulating collective bargaining
as a war measure is still in an empirical stage. As indicated above, WPB
(formerly OPM) has been convening employers and employees to plan for
the conversion of plants and the training and re-employment of workers.
The agreements reached have been informal, but the obligations under-
taken have generally been fulfilled, with the active cooperation of the
Government. The plan of WPB for establishing management-labor pro-
duction committees also calls for informal agreements. The implementing
of these working arrangements by specific provisions in union agreements
is a possibility to be explored by the parties involved as their experience
with such Government inspired arrangements increases.
What has been said above presents merely the potentialities of union
agreements as a weapon of war. There is no certainty that these possibil-
ities will be realized. Inherent in the nature of collective bargaining is the
fact that union agreements will contain the imperfections as well as the
excellent qualities of the people who negotiate them. But the writer knows
76 Government-AFL Building Pact, 8 L.R.R. 764 (1941).
77 Wage Rise Limits in the Building Industry, io L.R.R. 442 (1942).
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of no alternative, whether it be Government decree, military rule, em-
ployers' will, or the free interplay of competitive forces, that is not subject
to the same frailties in the same or greater degree. Collective bargaining
is one of our accepted social institutions, part of our democratic way of
life. Its potential values for our present crisis are well worth exploiting.
One further look ahead may be ventured. It may be premature to draw
blueprints of the peace that will follow this war, but it cannot be too early
to realize that we are certain to face grave problems at the end of the hos-
tilities. The conversion back to the industries of peace may be a greater
task than the conversion from peace to war. In the post-war period we
may not have the pressure of time and an aggressive enemy, but at the
same time we shall not have the powerful emotional forces and the simple
purpose that unify our nation at war. We are likely to be torn into bitter
factions over whether we should cease Government spending at once or
continue Government planning and regulation. We will be in need then
more than ever of groups of citizens trained to participate in their civic
and economic affairs. Such groups may be prepared today among the
managers and workers in industry through the practices of collective bar-
gaining. The very measures suggested above as measures for war would
prepare groups to meet the problems of industry in peace. The practices
of collective bargaining habituate employers and employees in patterns of
behavior-patterns of cooperative action, patterns of resolving conflicting
interests, patterns of personal responsibility, patterns of voluntary action
-patterns that will not only help win the war but that also will help pre-
serve our democratic future.
